The same conversation that’s been happening for the last several years in retail is still being rehashed in retail right now.
How do we stop return abuse? The answer most merchants reach for is a stricter policy: fees, tighter windows, restocking charges, photo requirements. The logic is straightforward; if you make returns harder to secure, then fewer people will abuse them.
The data doesn’t support that logic, though. And the costs of getting it wrong extend further than most retailers realize.
Return fraud and policy abuse now cost U.S. retailers roughly $100 billion a year, representing 14.2% of the $706 billion in annual returns. That figure breaks down into approximately $14 billion in outright fraud and $86 billion in what the industry generalizes as policy abuse (wardrobing, bracketing, returning used items as new, etc.). Those two categories behave differently and require different responses, but most merchants treat them as a single problem with a single lever.
That lever is the returns policy. And it’s not working the way they think it is.
Return Fraud, Customer Friction, & Chargebacks: A Three-Way Trap
Nearly two-thirds of consumers admit to at least one form of returns abuse. When merchants respond by adding fees or restrictions, the results are inconsistent at best: 44% of merchants that added return fees saw fraud increase, while 42% saw it fall.
The intervention doesn’t reliably solve the problem. What it does reliably do is create friction for the customers who weren’t abusing anything.
Retailers make returns easier and abuse goes up. They make returns harder and customers walk away. It’s not a clever paradox; it’s what the data actually shows, as eight in ten shoppers say a positive returns experience makes them more likely to buy from a retailer again, per the data cited above. The merchants tightening their policies to reduce abuse are simultaneously eroding one of their clearest retention signals.
That’s the first two sides of the trap. The third is the one that rarely gets discussed. Namely, that stricter return policies don’t just push customers away; they can push frustrated customers toward disputes.
Say a legitimate buyer can’t return an item through a retailer’s normal process. It could be because the window closed, because a fee made it not worth it, or because the process was confusing. Some of those buyers will opt to call their bank instead.
Our 2026 Chargeback Field Report found that 61.8% of merchants report chargebacks have risen over the past three years, with friendly fraud growing faster than overall chargeback volume. The connection between returns policy and chargeback volume isn’t speculative. It’s a pattern we see in the data repeatedly.
Siloing Loss Sources Makes the Problem Worse
The reason merchants miss this is structural.
Returns are managed by one team. Chargebacks are handled by another. The two datasets rarely share a system, and in most organizations, they don’t share a room. Each team is optimizing against its own numbers, often without visibility into what the other is seeing.
Treating them as completely separate problems makes it much harder to see the patterns connecting them. The same customer can appear in both records. The same SKU can generate both return abuse and downstream disputes. Without connecting that data, merchants are defending against the same behavior twice, through separate systems, paying twice for the same problem.
What I’d argue merchants need is a different question. Not just “How do we stop return abuse?” but “Which customers are showing up in both our returns data and our dispute records, and what does that tell us?”
Identifying those patterns changes what intervention looks like. It moves the conversation from blanket policy changes that affect every customer to targeted responses aimed at the behavior that’s actually generating loss.
Our data shows that 27.1% of merchant returns involve some form of abuse, and 62% of merchants call refund abuse a “moderate” or “significant” concern. Those numbers aren’t going to improve by making the returns process harder for everyone. They improve when merchants can distinguish between the customers who are costing them money and the ones who just want to return a shirt.
The retailers who figure that out first will have a structural advantage. They’ll stop absorbing costs they don’t fully understand, and they’ll stop making their best customers pay for the behavior of their worst ones. The ones who keep managing returns and chargebacks in separate silos, however, will keep having the same conversation next year. And the year after that.
